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COMMENTS
COMMUNITY-BASED OWNERSHIP OF A
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE FRANCHISE:
THE ANSWER TO RELOCATION AND TAXPAYER
FINANCING OF NFL TEAMS
When Art Modell announced that he was moving the Cleveland
Browns to Baltimore he sent a message to sports fans
everywhere... that fan loyalty doesn't matter... that today's
fan shouldn't get too attached-because it's all about money ...
[Ijt's not just about the Browns. It's about the game.... Your
city could be next.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Take notice, because your city could be next in line to confront the loss
of a hometown favorite. Your National Football League ("NFL" or
"League") team could be the next to pack up and relocate. The Browns'
1996 move from their home in Cleveland, Ohio, is one of the latest in a
recent trend of completed, impending, or threatened franchise relocations in
the NFL.3 Franchise relocation has escalated to an unprecedented level since
the 1984 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL.4 In that case, the Ninth
1. Browns Supporters, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 1996, at C3.
2. See If This Is Allowed to Happen to Cleveland, It Can Happen to Your City Too!, USA
TODAY, Jan. 12, 1996, atC4.
3. Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National
Football League, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 476 (1997). For example, the Los Angeles area lost
two teams in 1995. The Rams moved to St. Louis to fill the vacancy left by the Cardinals' move to
Phoenix in 1988, and the Raiders returned to Oakland after playing for 13 years in Los Angeles.
Id. Bud Adams moved his Oilers from Houston to Nashville to begin play in Nashville in 1996.
Id. Since 1995, the Seattle Seahawks, Chicago Bears, Cincinnati Bengals, Tampa Bay
Buccaneers, and the Arizona Cardinals all intimated their intention to move if they did not receive
better stadium deals. Id.
4. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Oakland-Alameda County
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Circuit held that the NFL's policy restricting franchise relocation violated
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' In the ensuing years, many owners
of NFL franchises have exploited the holding in Raiders by instigating a
"relocation frenzy," considered by many to be driven by the owners' desire
for money.6
Many NFL franchise owners, hoping to relocate their teams to tap into
more profitable markets, now seek new stadiums complete with luxury
suites from which they can derive millions in unshared revenue.7 Ambitious
NFL owners have been known to move to the city offering the best deal,8
regardless of the degree of local support and fan loyalty they leave behind. 9
Once a team leaves a city, it is no easy task to fill the void by enticing
an existing team to relocate. For example, Baltimore enjoyed and supported
the Colts from 1953 to 1984, but went without an NFL team until 1996
when the Browns left Cleveland and became the Baltimore Ravens.'0 Also,
following the departure of the Rams and the Raiders in 1995,"1 Los Angeles,
the second largest television market in the country, 2 has been without a
Coliseum, Inc. v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders].
5. Id.; see Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (providing that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal").
6. See Sanjay Jos6 Mullick, Browns To Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency and the New
Economics of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 15 (1996); Kevin Starr, A Covenant Broken: The
Bonds Linking City and Professional Football Team and Fan Are Being Increasingly Sundered
by Owners Whose Only Loyalty Is to the Dollar, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1995, at 61.
7. Alan J. Ostfield, Seat License Revenue in the National Football League: Shareable or
Not?, 5 SETON HALL J. OF SPORTS L. 599, 604 (1995). The NFL is largely a revenue-sharing
league, all network television income is shared equally among the 30 teams. Id. Additionally,
revenues from game ticket sales are split 60/40 between home and visiting teams, respectively. Id.
Non-ticket, luxury-box stadium revenue is the principal exception carved out of the revenue-
sharing system. Mullick, supra note 6, at 16.
8. Leone, supra note 3, at 484-92. Cities want NFL teams because of the publicity, major-
league image, civic pride, and tax revenues that accompany the presence of an NFL team. Id. In
order to obtain teams of their own, cities will often assume enormous long-term financial
obligations. Id. Twenty-seven of the NFL's 30 teams currently play in publicly owned stadiums.
Id.
9. See Adam Teicher, NFL Teams Walk When Money Talks Cleveland Browns' Plan to
Move Makes Fans Worry About Own Teams, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 12, 1995, at Al. For
example, before the Browns moved to Baltimore, they regularly attracted home crowds in excess of
70,000 (fourth largest in the League). Id. Their "Dawg Pound" boasted some of the most rabid of
NFL fans, and their telecasts were one of the most watched in the country. Id. Further, in the
wake of the announced move, Cleveland voters approved a S175 million plan to renovate
Cleveland Stadium in an effort to keep the team. Leone, supra note 3, at 475.
10. THE OFFICIAL NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK 269, 273, 276
(Chris McCloskey & Chuck Garity, Jr. eds. 1996) [hereinafter 1996 RECORD & FACT BOOK].
11. Id. at 276.
12. Tony Grossi, After Cleveland, Owners Will Focus on LA., PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Mar. 22, 1998, at 9C.
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team for three years. The difficulty cities have in luring NFL franchises is
primarily due to the pressures the NFL team owners place on local
governments to build and pay for a new stadium.
13
The necessity for cities to provide state-of-the-art stadiums to lure
NFL teams has reached a critical level. 14  Having awarded Cleveland an
expansion team for the 1999 season, 5 the NFL is now looking for a city to
accommodate a thirty-second team, considering both Los Angeles 16 and the
pre-1997 home of the Oilers franchise, Houston.' 7 It will be quite difficult
for a city to acquire a new franchise. Any new franshise deal requires initial
capital of an estimated $700 million: about $500 million on fees paid to the
NFL,'8 and about $200 million to build a state-of-the-art stadium. 19
Consequently, no city is likely to be granted a team until it hurdles the
13. See Richard Aim, NFL's Suite Life: Moves by LA Teams Show Importance of Stadium
Deals, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Sept. 11, 1995, at DI. For example, Los Angeles has not been
able to maintain a team without a profit-maximizing, state-of-the-art stadium. Id. The former Los
Angeles Rams played in the Los Angeles Coliseum from 1946 to 1979, and then in Anaheim
Stadium, now known as Edison International Field of Anaheim, from 1980 to 1994. Id. The
aging Coliseum erected in 1923, contains no luxury boxes, while Anaheim Stadium's 113 luxury
suites derived a maximum of $4.3 million annually. Id. By moving to a newly built stadium in St.
Louis, the Rams had the opportunity to make $20 million annually in stadium revenues. Id.
14. T.J. Simers, NFL Appears to Love L.A., L.A. TIES, Mar. 25, 1998, at Cl.
15. T.J. Simers, Lerner-Policy Group Wins Browns: NFL Approves Record $530-million
Purchase, Then Turns Attention to Los Angeles and Houston, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 1998, at C3.
On Sept. 8, 1998, the NFL owners selected Alfred Lerner and Carmen Policy as the new owners of
the Cleveland Browns franchise. Id The Lerner-Policy group paid the NFL $530 million to buy
the Cleveland Browns. Id.
16. Id.; see also Rick Orlov, City to Play Tough with NFL: Officials to Tout Report Citing
Decrease in Television Viewership, L.A. DAILY NEws, Sept. 17, 1997, (News), at 4 (reporting
that the NFL wants to return a team to Los Angeles, the second largest television market, because
since Los Angeles lost a team, the NFL has lost $5-6 million a year due to the drop in television
viewing in the Los Angeles area). If an expansion team were to return to Los Angeles, there is a
potential for approximately $19 million in additional revenue. Id.
17. Simers, supra note 15, at C3 (reporting that on Oct. 27-28, 1998 both Houston and Los
Angeles will be invited to make presentations to all 31 NFL owners in their bid for the thirty-
second team).
18. Owners of an expansion team are required to pay the NFL a certain amount of money to
join the League. Simers, supra note 14, at Cl; see also Dick Patrick, Dollars Expand with Each
New Team: Franchise Moves Might Be the Next Agent of Change, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1994, at
1OC (reporting that to begin play in 1995 both the Jacksonville Jaguars and the Carolina Panthers
paid the NFL $140 million in expansion fees); Simers, supra note 15, at C3 (reporting that the
winner of the match race between Houston and Los Angeles undoubtedly will have to start at
Clevelands $530 million expansion tariff). Lerner and Policy were willing to pay almost three
times what Carolina and Jacksonville paid only three years ago, because they are expected to
collect $30 million a year in stadium revenues and an average of $73.3 million in TV money for the
next eight years. Id
19. See Leone, supra note 3, at 485-92.
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obstacle of providing viable financing plans for building a new stadium and
finding an individual or group with enough money to purchase a franchise.20
This Comment proposes community-based public ownership of NFL
franchises as a mechanism for generating the necessary funding to obtain an
NFL team and prevent it from relocating in the future. The rising popularity
of this concept is enhanced by a bill that was introduced in Congress in
February 1997 by Congressman Earl Blumenauer from Portland." The bill,
entitled the "Give Fans a Chance Act," would prohibit any professional
sports franchise from banning public ownership.22
Part II contains a blue-print for a publicly owned NFL franchise using
the Green Bay Packers as a working model.23 Part III discusses why
community-based ownership is more desirable for cities, taxpayers, fans,
and the NFL than having privately owned NFL teams. This Part explains
how a community-based entity could reduce the occurrence of franchise
relocation by shifting much of the financial burden of acquiring and
maintaining NFL teams from small groups of owners, who hold cities
hostage with their demands, to larger groups of individual fans eager to own
an interest in an NFL team.
Part IV reveals that as currently enforced, the NFL's Constitution and
Bylaws effectively prohibit community-based corporations from owning an
NFL franchise. Part IV also explains the "rule of reason" test under section
1 of the Sherman Act. This Comment contends that the NFL's prohibition
on public ownership of NFL teams establishes a prima facie case for an
antitrust injury under section 1 of the Sherman Act. This Part also argues
that the NFL's policy on public ownership fails the rule of reason test
because the harms of such a policy outweigh its benefits. This Part
discusses alternative ways that the NFL can achieve the benefits it deems
necessary to its survival as an organization, and suggests that community-
20. Id.; see also Jim Newton, NFL Stadium Proposals Far from the Goal Line, L.A_ TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1998, at Al (containing an extensive discussion of the proposed funding and sites for a
new stadium in Los Angeles).
21. Art Thiel, Public Sharing of NFL Teams Due for Look, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 5, 1997 (Sports), at D1.
22. Id; see also Don Esmonde, Threats Disappear When Communities Own Pro Teams,
BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 12, 1997 (Local), at Cl; Daniel Kraker and David Morris, The Ticket to
Community Pride, Prosperity: Let the Public Own the Pro Teams, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 16,
1997 (Viewpoints), at H5; Editorials, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, Apr. 6, 1997 (Commentary), at 2;
Rice Elliott Almond, Stock in M's, Hawks? It's a Thought; Public Stake in Teams 'Worth
Pursuing, 'THE SEATTLE TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1997 (News), at Al.
23. The Green Bay Packers are the only publicly owned team in the League, and this
ownership structure is possible because the Packers' community ownership predates NFL rules
prohibiting public ownership. David Nielsen, Packer Envy: Green Bay Fans Don't Have to
WorryAbout Their Team Moving-They Ownlt, WASH. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1995, at Bl.
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based ownership would actually strengthen the NFL. Part V concludes that
community-based ownership of NFL franchises is an ideal way for the NFL
to regain stability and return professional football to its place in the center of
popular culture in the United States.
II. BLUEPRINT FOR A COMMUNITY-OWNED NFL FRANCHISE
A. The Green Bay Packers Model
With the sole exception of the publicly held non-profit Green Bay
Packers, Inc.,24 the NFL consists of thirty-one privately owned teams.
25
NFL teams are predominantly owned by closely held corporations, though
some are owned by partnerships and a few by individuals.26 While many
cities have been exploited by their own team or other potential teams in the
form of lucrative subsidy packages, the city of Green Bay has never faced
the threat of the Packers relocating.27
The Packers have played in Green Bay since 1919, two years before
joining the fledgling NFL, when the club was formed by Curly Lambeau.25
In 1923, a group of local Green Bay businessmen organized the club as a
Wiconsin nonprofit corporation.29 When the club was financially struggling
in 1935, it was reorganized as a Wisconsin nonprofit stock corporation. 0
The Green Bay Packers Corporation was at this time authorized to issue 300
shares of common stock.31 In 1950, when the Green Bay Corporation
desired to ensure its ability to remain a long-term competitor in the NFL, the
Green Bay Corporation's stockholders authorized the Corporation to issue
up to 10,000 shares of common stock to raise funds for the Corporation.32
The shares were offered at $25 per share.33
24. Id.
25. Simers, supra note 15, at C3.
26. See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1390.
27. Mike Ivey, Packers Offer Example for Corporate America, CAP. Tnvffis (Madison, Wis.),
Jan. 13, 1996, at BI.
28. Green Bay Packers, Inc. Common Stock Offering Document, Nov. 14, 1997 (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Green Bay Packers Offering
Document].
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id
32. Id. Although the original stockholders receive no financial return, they insist that money
and profits are not their primary concern; rather, they claim that the status they enjoy as Packers'
stockholders is enough. Id.
33. Nielsen, supra note 23, at Bl.
594 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJO URNAL [Vol.18
The Corporation's restated articles of incorporation provided that no
stockholder could own more than 200 shares, and the stock would pay no
dividends. 34 From 1950 to November 1997, the Packers had approximately
1900 shareholders who owned 4627 shares.35
In November 1997, the Packers' shareholders approved the issuance of
new stock involving a 1000-for-i stock split.36 In response to the new stock
offering, 106,000 Packers' fans bought stock at $200 per share, generating
$24 million for the Corporation.37 The new stock is largely ceremonial
because the new shareholders have diluted voting rights, no possibility of
profits, and may receive no other special benefits.38
The Packers are managed by a seven-member executive committee,
elected from a forty-five-person board of directors. 39  The board must
approve all substantive changes, such as upgrading the scoreboards at
Lambeau Field, adding luxury boxes to the stadium, or building a new
indoor practice facility.40 President Bob Harlan and executive vice-
president/general manager John Fabry have authority to make all football
operations decisions.4'
One of the most important features of the Packers' bylaws is that a
majority vote of the shareholders is necessary to relocate the team.42 With
over ninety percent of the shareholders residing in Green Bay, all
presumably rabid Packers fans, it is highly unlikely that any shareholder
would ever vote to relocate the team.43 Furthermore, if a shareholder ever
desires to sell his or her stock, the Packers' bylaws state that the shares must
34. Id.
35. Green Bay Packers Offering Document, supra note 28, at 8.
36. Kent Youngblood, Shareholders Set to Approve Additional Shares of Stock, Wis. ST. J.
(Madison, Wis.), Nov. 13, 1997, at B3.
37. Green Bay Packers Offering Document, supra note 28, at 2; see also Packers to Report
Record Profits, WIs. ST. J. (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 10, 1998, at C2. The Packers must use this $24
million for capital improvements rather than on salaries for players and coaches. Id. However,
this additional revenue essentially allows the Packers to spend more on players and coaches
because future capital expenditures will not drain their cash flow. Id.
38. Youngblood, supra note 36, at B3; see also Green Bay Packers Offering Document,
supra note 28, at 5.
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be offered back to the franchise first." As a result of this corporate
structure, the publicly owned Packers have become the most stable team in
the NFL.45
With the smallest market (population 96,466),46 and one of the smallest
stadiums (seating 60,790), 47 the Packers' annual income is one of the
smallest in the League.4 The Packers' financial success and viability is
primarily due to the NFL's revenue-sharing system. 49 The Packers' success
is also contingent on the effectiveness of the NFL salary cap, instituted in
1993 to equalize the competitive balance between the League's large and
small market teams.50 The Packers' tremendous recent on-field success is
demonstrated by their winning Super Bowl XXXI 5 and appearing in Super
Bowl XXXII.12 Their great off-field success is demonstrated by their local
popularity and the $166 million value of their franchise.53 Hence, the Green
Bay Packers provide an example of the potential economic success and
popularity of a community-owned team.
44. Green Bay Packers Offering Document, supra note 28, at 4. The only limited exception
to this rule is that the stock shares may be transferred to the holder's immediate family.
45. Nielsen, supra note 23, at BI.
46. Id.
47. Bill Plaschke, Packers Super, Fans Are Better, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Jan. 11,
1997, at B3.
48. Tom Muihern, Wolf Tells Shareholders: Put Focus on Football, CAP. TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), May 29, 1997, at C4. The Packers record income for 1997 was nearly $5.9 million. Id.
The Dallas Cowboys' annual profit for 1996 was over $25 million. Ivey, supra note 27, at BI; see
also Tom Pedulla, Loyalty Never out of Stock: Shareholder Reap Dividend of Pride in Pack,
USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 1997, at 5C (containing the Packers' 1996 income statement). Interestingly,
because the Packers are the only publicly owned team in the League, it is the only team subject to
disclose it finances. The Packers' income statement for fiscal year ending March 31, 1996,
revealed the following: Operating Income: Television and Radio: $38,962,954; Home Games:
S9,116,329; Road Games: $6,955,224; Private boxes: $3,775,000; NFL properties: $3,152,329;
Expansion fees: $2,279,351; Other: $6,053,078; Total operating income: $70,294,265;
Operating Expenses: Player Costs: $41,453,668; General/administrative: $19,494,478; Game
Expenses $1,782,233; Total Operating Expenses: $62,730,379; Profit From Operations: Interest
expense: $403,210; Interest/dividend income: $1,689,784; Sale of assets: $1,090,168; Income
before taxes: $9,940,628; Allowance for income taxes: $4,500,000; Net Income: $5,440,628. Id.
49. Mark Kreidler, Rozelle's Vision Changed Football, SACRAMENTo BEE, Dec. 7, 1996, at
El.
50. Nielson, supra note 23, at BI; see discussion infra Part IV.D.3.b.
51. Bob Oates, Super Bowl: Green Bay Packers 35, New England 21, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1997, at S3.
52. Bob Oates, Super Bowl XXXI: Denver Broncos vs. Green Bay Packers Analysis:
Broncos' Best Shot Is to Make Packers Play Catch-Up, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, at C 12.
53. See Pedulla, supra note 48, at 5C. The Packers value is due in part to the Packers' assets
and stockholders' equity totaling $68.785 million, and recording a 1996 profit of almost $5.5
million. Id.
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B. The Modern Community-Owned Corporate Entity
1. Formation of the Entity
Under the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws, a community-owned
corporation, similar to the Green Bay Packers Corporation, could be formed
specifically for the purpose of owning and operating an NFL franchise in a
particular city.54 The incorporator of the community-owned team should be
a high-profile, public-spirited individual or a leadership group, ideally with
some NFL or other major league sports experience. The incorporators
would prepare and file55 a certificate of incorporation
5 6 and bylaws.5 7
In addition, the incorporators would take all other steps necessary to
form the ownership entity.58 For instance, the incorporators would negotiate
with the NFL for an expansion franchise for the designated city. The
incorporators would also negotiate with the city and other governmental
entities for a stadium and related facilities. 59 The deals negotiated with the
NFL and the city would be contingent upon a successful public offering of
stock in the ownership entity and receipt of any other required financing and
governmental approvals, such as zoning and environmental impact clearance
for building the new stadium. To this extent, the incorporator should be
prepared to advance the costs associated with securing the necessary
entitlements, as well as the costs associated with incorporating and
organizing the new entity.
The corporation would then make an initial public offering ("IPO") of
stock in the ownership entity. The IPO would be arranged by a group of
attorneys, accountants, bankers, underwriters, and other professionals so as
to assure compliance with all applicable state and federal laws. These
professionals should all be dedicated to the purpose of creating a permanent
football entity within a particular city.
54. 1988 NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS art. III, § 3.2 (allowing any entity operated for
the purpose of owning a football team to be eligible for membership) [hereinafter NFL CONST.];
see discussion infra Part IV.A.
55. This Comment references the requirements of the Delaware Code because it is often the
preferred state of incorporation due to its flexible rules. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 10 1(a).
56. See id. §§ 102-05 (1991).
57. See id. § 109.
58. See id. §§ 106, 107.
59. See Stuart Silverstein & Jim Newton, Financing Remains the Unknown Factor, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1998, at A19. It has recently been proposed that a real estate investment trust
("REIT"') could be established, enabling fans to purchase shares to help finance a stadium. See id.
While this idea is less likely to attract investors than the proposal to actually buy stock in the team
itself it may be a viable way to acquire additional funds. Id.
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Limiting the purpose of the corporation to the operation of an NFL
franchise within a specific geographic area would be the primary means of
generating widespread community support for the ownership entity and the
IPO.60  Such a geographic-specific provision should be stated in the
certificate of incorporation and supported by other provisions in the
certificate and bylaws,61 such as a requirement that the team could not be
relocated or sold without the approval of a super-majority of the
shareholders.62
The IPO should be structured in a manner that would encourage
widespread ownership by persons living in the designated geographic area
and having an interest in NFL football. Thus, a large number of shares of
stock should be offered for sale at a price an average football fan in the
community could afford.63 In addition, a limitation on the number of shares
that any one person or group could purchase should be imposed to ensure a
broad ownership base, rather than allowing a few wealthy individuals or
companies to buy all the stock.64
2. A Hypothetical IPO
The board of directors would determine the appropriate share price and
number of shares to issue in order to generate the capital necessary to pay
for the stadium and expansion fees.6' This Comment provides an example
of how the shares could be issued. For example, two classes of stock could
be offered, essentially setting up an investment tier as well as a fan-based
tier. Under this model, a total of thirteen million total shares should be
offered.
With thirteen million total shares, the investment tier would consist of
three million shares of non-voting cumulative preferred stock. This
investment tier Class A preferred stock would be offered at $100 a share and
would carry approximately a ten percent dividend yield. There would be no
limitation on how many shares anyone could buy of Class A stock. With
three million shares at $100 dollars per share, the offering of Class A stock
could generate $300 million. While it is conceivable that one wealthy person
or company could buy all of this Class A stock, the community-owned
60. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(aX3), 102(bX1).
61. See id. § 242 (bX 1) (describing how to amend the certificate of incorporation); id. § 109
(describing how to amend the bylaws).
62. See id. § 102 (bX4).
63. The certificate of incorporation would list the number of authorized shares of stock to be
sold. See id. § 102 (aX4).
64. See id. §§ 102 (bX1), 109(b), 151(a).
65. See id. § 152.
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nature of the corporation would not be diminished if the Class A shares do
not carry voting rights. Class A shares would be attractive to investors
nonetheless because it is anticipated that virtually all the operating profit of
the franchise, if any, would be used to pay dividends to the Class A
preferred shareholders.
The second tier would consist of the Class B voting common stock,
presumably sold to NFL fans. Ten million shares of Class B stock could be
offered at $40 per share. 66 This stock offering would generate $400 million
of equity capital. To encourage widespread ownership, each individual,
family group, or company would be restricted to purchasing only two
hundred shares of Class B stock. Further, the Class B shareholders would
be required to offer the shares back to the franchise at the original IPO price
when a shareholder wished to sell. No dividends would be paid on Class B
stock. Nonetheless, many residents would likely be interested in such stock
as a way of participating in ownership of an NFL team and bringing a team
to their city.
67
Because Class B stock does not pay dividends, it is recommended that
a provision be made in the certificate of incorporation entitling a fan who
purchases two hundred shares to a personal seat license ("PSL").68  With
10,000,000 shares offered, subject to a limitation of two hundred shares per
shareholder, 50,000 shareholder-owned PSLs would be issued. Thus, with
the shareholder essentially receiving a PSL as the sole material benefit from
buying stock in the franchise, rather than receiving dividends, shareholder-
fans would be highly motivated to keep the team in the particular city in
which it was formed.
66. Compare this price to the $25 price for original shares in the Green Bay Packers. See
Nielsen, supra note 23, at B 1.
67. For instance, shareholders purchased stock in the Green Bay Packers even though the
stock paid no dividends. See Pedulla, supra note 48, at 5C. Instead, community members
purchased stock as a gesture of hometown pride and loyalty and received the advantage of being a
season-ticket holder. Id. "'A shareholder is someone of distinction in Green Bay .... Stock
certificates are framed and proudly displayed in living rooms.... Home games have been sold out
since 1966. The season-ticket waiting list counts more than 28,000 names and frequently includes
newborns." Id.
68. A PSL is a right to purchase a season ticket, but is not itself a season ticket. See
discussion Part III.B. If offering PSLs is not desirable, an alternative inducement for stock
ownership is to provide ticket price discounts, club house privileges, autographed memorabilia, or
other incidental benefits. Perhaps offering the right to attend a gala annual shareholders meeting
in the team's new stadium combined, for example, with the annual awards dinner for the team,
would be an attractive inducement to stock ownership.
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Under the conditions described above, if the IPO was fully subscribed69
the offering would result in a total of $700 million in equity capital for the
ownership entity. With this amount of money, any additional funding
necessary to acquire the franchise, stadium, and other facilities, as well as
initial operating capital, could be provided from other sources such as bank
financing or private donations.
3. Compliance with NFL Membership Requirements
The NFL Bylaws require a financial statement from every officer,
director, and shareholder of an entity applying for membership. 70 After
considering the financial statements, the NFL has the ultimate authority to
approve the applicants.71 To comply with this requirement, the certificate of
incorporation must state that the directors and officers of such corporation
will be subject to the ultimate approval of the NFL.72 Ostensibly, giving
other owners and the League authority over the decision to admit new
members gives them a way to ensure that the NFL is represented by persons
who will promote the NFL. Such an addition to the certificate of
incorporation would also be advisable, given that the board of directors and
officers will need to work with the NFL in various ways to control the
conduct of the corporation.73
Obtaining NFL approval of all shareholders, on the other hand, may
prove impracticable. 74 However, with the effective limitation on the number
of shares any one individual can own, it would be unnecessary for the NFL
to approve each individual shareholder as no individual shareholder could
control the company or even elect a single director. If the limitation on the
number of shares any one individual or company could own was not
effectively imposed, the certificate of incorporation could grant the NFL the
69. If the IPO was over-subscribed, shares should be allocated to the subscribers by random
selection, such as a lottery, which would also impose the stated limitation on the maximum number
of shares any one individual, or family group, could purchase. If the IPO was under-subscribed,
the proposed transaction with the NFL or city in question could be re-negotiated in order to arrive
at a workable deal.
70. NFL CONST., supra note 54, art. III, § 3.3.
71. Id.
72. While this may sound tedious, the NFL currently approves the officers and directors of
the other private corporations of the NFL. This might encourage a small board of directors.
73. For example, the vice president/general manager, along with such duties as hiring a
coach, drafting players, and negotiating player contracts, would have the responsibility to attend
the NFL annual meetings. Thus, the officer and directors of the corporation should be persons the
of whom the NFL approves and believes will act in the best interest of the NFL.
74. See discussion in Part IV.D.3.a. (discussing why NFL membership rules pertaining to all
shareholders would not only be impracticable, but would also be an antitrust violation for a
publicly owned team).
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right to approve any shareholder owning more than five percent of the total
outstanding shares. 75 In all other respects, the community-owned entity in
question would be formed, managed, and operated like any other general
commercial corporation.
III. THE BENEFITS OF COMMUNITY-BASED PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
A. Ability to Transform the NFL from the "National Floating League"
Back to the National Football League
Properly formed community-owned franchises could help reverse the
recent trend of franchise relocation that undermines the stability of the
NFL.76 The unchecked mobility of NFL teams disappoints football fans
everywhere and host cities alike.77 Frequent franchise relocation undermines
the NFL's fan base, destroys team loyalties, eliminates team rivalries, and
increases the public sentiment that team owners are greedy and self-
motivated.
78
As discussed in Part II, the certificate of incorporation and bylaws of a
community-owned corporate franchise could specifically state the conditions
under which the team would be allowed to move or be sold. As
75. This percentage was chosen because it serves the same goals as the requirement imposed
by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated thereunder by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d) (1994). Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act regulates tender offers and requires the release of
information about the bidder to shareholders of target companies, but its application has been
broadened to require purchasers of substantial amounts of stock to provide information about their
intentions. See Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39 ARIZ.
L. REv. 1315, 1334-35 (1997). Specifically, section 13(d) requires any person or group acquiring
more than 5% of a class of equity securities registered under section 12 to report the acquisition to
the SEC, the issuer, and the exchanges on which the security trades. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 13(dXl). The Schedule 13(d) report must disclose information about the acquiring
person or group, the funds used to make the acquisitions, and the acquirer's purpose in acquiring
the securities. See id. § 13(d)(1)(A)-(E).
Although the Securities Exchange Act does not empower the target corporation to veto any
stock purchases, the required information statement is extremely valuable. A reporting
requirement placed on purchasers of large blocks of stock in publicly owned NFL teams would
give the League and other team owners notice of consolidated ownership, and the power to veto
such purchases would allow the NFL to ensure that these persons would be suitable League
representatives in much the same way the current membership approval mechanism operate.
76. Richard Sandomir, Owners' New Strategy: Take the Team and Run, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
14, 1996, § 8, at 1. In response to this trend of franchise relocation, former NFL Commissioner
Pete Rozelle declared, "This may be the biggest problem the league has ever faced .... The
integrity of the league and its stability is [sic] hinged on local support." Id.
77. Leone, supra note 3, at 491.
78. Id.
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demonstrated by the history of the Green Bay Packers, teams owned by
residents of the community are unlikely to move away from that community.
B. Reducing the Need for Publicly Financed "Suite" Deals
Community-based ownership of NFL teams is desirable for cities,
taxpayers, and fans alike because this corporate entity, being largely self-
funded, would not be dependent on cities for huge subsidies. Recent football
history is replete with examples of extravagant public financing to lure NFL
teams. The deal that induced Art Modell to move the Cleveland Browns to
Baltimore offered a $200 million, 70,000-seat, rent-free stadium with 108
luxury boxes and 7500 club seats. 79 Baltimore also promised Modell a $15
million training facility, 100% of the revenues from ticket sales, luxury
suites, club seats, concessions, stadium-naming rights, parking, and half of
all revenues from non-football events held in the stadium.0 Similarly, the
Los Angeles Rams were lured to St. Louis by an offer of a new $260 million
stadium, a guarantee that tickets for at least 55,000 of the 70,000 stadium
seats would be purchased for every game, $15 million towards their
relocation costs, another $15 million for a practice facility, and retirement of
the $30 million debt that the Rams owed the city of Anaheim at the time of
the move."
Currently, cities use a variety of public financing mechanisms to fund
the construction of new stadiums or renovations of existing facilities.82
Cities utilize low interest municipal bonds, lotteries, sales taxes, and levies
on parking, hotels, alcohol, car rentals, and cigarettes to finance subsidies to
team owners.83 Cities may also offer tax abatements on land, broadcast
arrangements, and assumption of past debts. Cities essentially fund these
initiatives by passing new taxes, extending old ones, and reallocating money
from one pocket to another.85 Ultimately, the taxpayers bear the burden of
all these subsidies.
Cities and owners also rely heavily on revenue from Personal Seat
Licenses ("PSLs") to raise money for new franchises and stadiums.86 PSLs
79. See Leone, supra note 3, at 486.
80. Id.
81. Aim, supra note 13, at DI.
82. See Leone, supra note 3, at 485.
83. Id. at 486.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. In Charlotte, the home of the new Carolina Panthers, the team raised S150 million to
build Ericsson Stadium through PSLs. Ray Waddell, Oilers' Move to Nashville: Heading
Toward Reality, AMUSEMNT Bus., Nov. 6, 1995, at 16. Fans in St. Louis bid on 46,000 PSLs at
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essentially offer fans the chance to become charter member ticketholders by
paying a fee to reserve a seat for a certain number of seasons.8 7 PSLs range
in cost from $250 to $5400, yet the PSL holder still needs to purchase a
ticket for each game.8 8 Thus, in order to be a season-ticket holder, a fan
must first pay increased taxes, buy a PSL, and then buy a game ticket.
Cities continually bear the financial burden because no entrepreneur is
willing to take the economic risk of financing both a new team and a
stadium.8 9 In regard to subsidizing the acquisition of a new NFL franchise,
Peter O'Malley, who recently sold the Los Angeles Dodgers for $311
million,90 stated, "I don't believe any individual or company, can, should, or
will try to do this alone." 91 Moreover, the NFL does not want to promote
non-subsidized privately funded stadiums because it would set a precedent
for shifting the economic risk from cities back to the individual owners.
92
Thus, NFL host cities bear the huge subsidy risk and often are not
rewarded for their tremendous economic investment when teams leave for a
better deal offered by another city.93  Community-owned franchises would
effectively shift the burden from taxpayers to individuals interested in
owning a piece of an NFL team in a particular community. This shift in
NFL financing increases the likelihood of an NFL franchise staying in one
city as the shareholders of the team are highly motivated to keep the team as
a permanent fixture in their city.
C. Offering Cities an Alternative Mechanism for Acquiring an NFL
Franchise
Community-owned franchises would provide a way for cities that have
a large potential pool of fan support to overcome "general" opposition to
whatever amount of public funding may be necessary to acquire a team.
Currently, some cities that would otherwise be appropriate markets for an
NFL team are not willing to bear the financial burdens associated with
$250-S4000 each, raising $75 million to finance the Rams' move. Id.
87. Randall Lane, Bread and Circuses, FORBES, June 6, 1994, at 62. A PSL is not a ticket
itself; it is merely the right to purchase a ticket. Id.
88. Peter Fimrite, Why Raiders Are a Bargain for Oakland: Other Cities Spending Far
More to Lure Teams, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 5, 1995, at Al.
89. T.J. Simers, LA. Goes Fourth and Loooooooong: Every Answer to Every Question
About the Future of Pro Football in LA., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, at C8.
90. Jim Murray, O'MalleyMoved-RestlsHistory, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1998, at Wl.
91. Simers, supra note 89, at C8. For example, the only stadium that has been privately built
for football in the last 50 years was Joe Robbie Stadium in Miami. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Leone, supra note 3, at 491-92.
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subsidizing the acquisition of an NFL franchise. 94 Los Angeles is a
prominent example of a major city reluctant to approve public subsidies for
an NFL team. 95 Currently, projects such as sports stadiums need only be
approved by the City Council. 96 However, the City Council's reluctance to
grant public funding is evidenced by the tremendous struggle certain
developers experienced in persuading the City Council to subsidize the
construction of a new sports arena in downtown Los Angeles.97 Strong
opposition came from Council members who believed that voters did not
want their hard-earned tax dollars spent to subsidize wealthy sports team
owners.98 The downtown arena developers finally gained approval for their
project only after reaching an extensive agreement with city officials
assuring the city would incur no financial risk.99
Although acquiring public funding for sports projects in Los Angeles is
difficult, it soon could become nearly impossible. The downtown arena
battle prompted Los Angeles City Councilman Joel Wachs to initiate a ballot
measure for the November 1998 election that would require city-wide voter
approval of publicly subsidized sports stadiums. 00 If the Wachs initiative
94. Id. at 487. There are risks involved for the city subsidizing the sports franchise. Id. For
example, a 1991 study by Pepperdine University economist Dean Baim showed that
"[g]overnment-subsidized sports stadiums are chronic money losers .... .. The ultimate
beneficiaries of tax-supported subsidies are the team owners, not the fans; and [g]overnment-
subsidized sports stadiums are unlikely to return enough money to the municipal treasury to pay
their combined operating and fixed costs." Id.; see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust
Rationale for the Expansion of Professional Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677, 1701
(1996). City-subsidized sports teams may cause a reduction in the ability of such cities to meet the
traditional municipal responsibilities, such as improving public schools, health care, or housing.
Id.
95. Aim, supra note 13, at D1.
96. Ted Rohrlich, Arena Developers Adopt a Strategy of Disclosure, L.A. TvIMBS, Aug. 28,
1997, at Al.
97. Id. The Arena is being built for the NHL's Los Angeles Kings and the NBA's Los
Angeles Lakers and Clippers. See Rick Orlov, Big Money, Plans Orbit New Arena, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 18, 1998, (News), at 7.
98. Rick Orlov, Drive Launched on Sports Funding, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 27, 1997,
(News), at 4.
99. Beth Shuster, Wachs Approves Altered Deal on Sports Arena, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1997,
at Al. The conditions of the agreement were that the developers: (1) must give the city an
"ironclad" guarantee that they will repay the $58 million in municipal bonds that are to be used for
the project; (2) ensure that the $58 million will not come from sales, property, or utility taxes
generated by the arena; (3) pay approximately S1.6 million for a two-acre piece of property that the
city had tentatively agreed to give to the developers; and (4) pay approximately $3.2 million for use
of the arena site for 55 years. The previous deal called for a $1-a-year lease. The only public
money involved in the arena would be $12 million given to the developers by the Community
Redevelopment Agency, which can control its own spending to help with projects located in the
central business districts. Id.
100. Id. The Wachs initiative is entitled "City of Los Angeles Taxpayers Right to Vote Act."
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passes, it will be even more difficult for Los Angeles to issue municipal
bonds or to provide other taxpayer-based financing for sports facilities. The
community-owned franchise, with its inherent high degree of fan support and
largely self-funded nature, would relieve the problem cities have in providing
the appropriate level of subsidies necessary to attract an NFL team.
IV. THE RULE OF REASON TEST AS APPLIED TO THE NFL RULES
PROHIBITING PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
This Comment contends that the NFL Bylaws, which effectively
prohibit public ownership of an NFL franchise, violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act. This Part demonstrates that a prima facie case for an
antitrust injury can be established for the public ownership prohibition.
A. NFL Bylaws Prohibiting Public Ownership
Article III of the NFL Bylaws contains the provisions governing who
may become a member of the League, that is, who may own an NFL
franchise. 10' The requirements for admissions of new members do not
contain any express provisions prohibiting a public corporation from owning
a franchise.0 2 In fact, rule 3.2 allows any individual or entity organized for
the purpose of operating a professional football club to be eligible for
membership, as long as such organization is operated for profit. 03 Thus, the
community-owned entity that this Comment proposes would be eligible for
membership.
However, the membership provisions for new members, when taken
together, have the effect of being so burdensome that it is a practical
impossibility for a public corporation to own a franchise. For example, rule
3.3(A)(1) requires "[t]he names and addresses of all persons who do or shall
own any interest or stock in the applicant, together with a statement that
such persons will not own or hold such interest or stock for the benefit of
any undisclosed person or organization. 1 4 Rule 3.3(A)(2) states that a
written financial statement is required from the applicant, including
stockholders.'0 5 Perhaps the most difficult rule to comply with is rule
3.3(C). That rule states, in relevant part, that "[e]ach proposed owner or
holder of any interest in a membership, including stockholders in any
Id.
101. NFL CONST., supra note 54, art. III.
102. Id.
103. Id. § 3.2 (a).
104. Id. § 3.3 (AX 1) (emphasis added).
105. Id. § 3.3 (AX2).
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corporation, and all other persons holding any interest in the applicant
must be individually approved by the affirmative vote of not less than three-
fourths or 20, whichever is greater, of the members of the League." 1 6 With
a community-owned NFL franchise anticipated to offer millions of shares of
stock and potentially having over 50,000 shareholders, gaining League
approval of each shareholder would be practically impossible.
Rule 3.5 of the Bylaws discusses transfer of ownership of an NFL
franchise. 10 7 This rule contains the uncodified, but well known, prohibition
against transfer of any interest of a member franchise to the public.'0 8 This
rule effectively precludes any kind of public ownership, including the
community-owned corporation proposed by this Comment.
The NFL's uncodified policy prohibiting the sale of any interest of an
existing member to the public was challenged in Sullivan v. NFL.109 In that
case, William H. Sullivan, the then owner of the New England Patriots,
brought an action against the NFL alleging that the NFL violated antitrust
laws by restricting owners of NFL franchises from selling shares in their
team to the public.'10 Sullivan, who was faced with financial difficulties and
increasing debt burdens, desired to offer forty-nine percent of the team to the
public in the form of publicly traded stock."' Sullivan requested that the
NFL either waive its public ownership prohibition or modify the prohibition
to allow for certain controlled sales to the public of minority interests in
106. Id. § 3.3 (C) (emphasis added).
107. NFL CONST., supra note 54, art. III., § 3.5.
108. See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1095 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190
(1994). NFL officials have also recognized the existence of this anti-corporate ownership policy.
Former NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle stated that public ownership of teams "would make it
impossible for [the NFL] to control ownership of [the] league." Corporately Yours, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 1991, at 15. Cincinnati Bengals assistant general manager Mike Brown
stated, "We have always opposed corporate involvement in NFL teams for the obvious reason that
corporations can fund the operation of teams far beyond anything we could do." Id.
109. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1095. Sullivan is a case closely analogous and highly applicable to
the concepts and issues presented in this Comment. It will be discussed extensively throughout
Part IV as the primary authority for the NFL's prohibition of public ownership violating antitrust
law. See also Drew D. Krause, Comment, The National Football League's Ban on Corporate
Ownership: Violating Antitrust to Preserve Traditional Ownership--Implications Arising From
William. Sullivan's Antitrust Suit, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 175 (1992).
110. Id. at 1095.
111. Id. Sullivan had owned the Patriots from their inception in 1959 when they belonged to
the American Football League ("AFL"). Id. In 1960, Sullivan and his partner sold non-voting
shares of the team to the public, as the former AFL had no prohibition against public ownership.
Id. When the AFL merged with the NFL in 1966, the new NFL was required to adopt the old
NFL's policy against public ownership. Id. However, the Patriots were allowed to retain their
level of public ownership as a special exception. Id. In 1976, Sullivan acquired all the publicly
held shares, making the Patriots a fully privately owned club. ld.
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NFL clubs." 2 After the NFL failed to act on the request, Sullivan brought
his lawsuit." 3
The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered
judgment for Sullivan, ruling that this NFL prohibition violated the Sherman
Act. 14 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Sullivan had
presented sufficient evidence of harm to competition in sale of ownership
interests in NFL clubs." 5 However, due to several prejudicial trial errors,
the First Circuit vacated and remanded the judgment of the District Court. 
116
No other court has decided the issue of whether the NFL policy prohibiting
public ownership interests of NFL franchises violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Therefore, the First Circuit's antitrust analysis of the NFL's
prohibition of public ownership for existing NFL franchises is the primary
authority by which to challenge the NFL's effective prohibition of public
ownership for new NFL franchises.
1 1 7
B. Section I of the Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every agreement, conspiracy,
or other concerted activity in restraint of trade." 8 This section was enacted
to prevent agreements that "restrict production, raise prices or otherwise
control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and
services."' 9 However, the Supreme Court, recognizing that virtually every
business agreement restrains trade to some degree, has held that Congress
did not intend for "every" agreement restraining trade be invalidated. 20 The
Court has developed two tests to determine if the Act has been violated: the
"per se" test and the "rule of reason" test.'
2'
112. Id. at 1095-96.
113. Id. at 1096.
114. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1091.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. While section 3.5, dealing with transfer of NFL membership, is the basis for the
uncodified prohibition on public ownership recognized in Sullivan, it is likely that the uncodified
policy pertains equally to new member franchises. Regardless of whether the uncodified policy
prohibits public ownership of new franchises, the requirement that all new owners be approved by
three-fourths of the team owners practically prohibits public ownership by itself.
118. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (providing that "[elvery contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal").
119. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
120. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); see also NCAA v. Board
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
121. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 85.
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Under the per se test, a court will hold a business practice "per se"
unlawful only when the court can predict with certainty that the restraint
violates the basic purposes of the Sherman Act.12 Courts have reserved per
se invalidity for blatant restraints of trade that further no purpose other than
the impairment of competition.12 1 With respect to such business practices,
the court will not inquire into the possible business justification for the
restraint in question.' 24 Such unlawful trade practices include: group
boycotts,'12 price fixing,126 horizontal Market division, 127 tying
arrangements, 28 and concerted refusals to deal.1
29
Restraints that do not fall into the per se category are analyzed under
the "rule of reason" test. 30 The rule of reason is particularly appropriate
when a court is confronted with an industry that requires cooperation among
its members in order to compete in the marketplace.' 31 Considering the
unique character of professional sports, 3 2 courts have generally rejected the
application of the per se test and have applied the rule of reason test in
deciding antitrust suits concerning League practices.1
33
122. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1387 (citing United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972)).
123. Id.
124. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
125. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
128. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
129. See, e.g., Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
130. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
131. Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied sub nom. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469
U.S. 990 (1984) [hereinafter Raiders].
132. See Lewis S. Kurlantzick, Thoughts on Professional Sports and the Antitrust Law: Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 15 CONN. L. REv. 183
(1983). Discussing the impact of the Raiders case, Professor Kurlantzick notes:
Professional sports teams do not fit neatly into traditional models of industrial
structure .... NFL teams are a hybrid form of economic animal-both business
rivals and partners. Unlike other industries, the success of each member of the
professional football industry depends, to a considerable extent, upr.-, the success of
all other members.
Id. at 189.
133. See, e.g., Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1381; North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d
Cir. 1983); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal vacated, 586 F.2d 644 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NH, 379 F. Supp. 966
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
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The rule of reason test is a balancing test that requires the fact-finder
to decide whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the agreement
imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition. 34 An activity restrains
trade if the anti-competitive effects of such activity outweigh its legitimate
business justifications.135  However, before balancing the positive and
negative effects on competition of the activity in question, 136 the plaintiff
must show that the challenged conduct restrains competition.
37
To establish a cause of action, the plaintiff must prove three
elements: 38  (1) an agreement among two or more persons or distinct
business entities; 39 (2) the agreement is intended to harm or unreasonably
restrain competition;' 4° and (3) the agreement actually causes injury to
competition. 1
41
C. Application of the Rule of Reason Test to the NFL 's Public Ownership
Policy: The Prima Facie Case
1. Element One: Whether an Agreement Exists Among Two or More
Persons or Distinct Business Entities: Applicability of the Single Entity
Defense
As discussed above, the NFL Bylaws, the conduct of the NFL in the
Sullivan case, and the candid discussions about the League's uncodified
policy against corporate ownership by NFL and team officials are evidence
that an agreement exists among the NFL owners to prohibit public
134. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1391; see also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918). Justice Brandeis, who articulated the test that has been uniformly adopted in
evaluating a restraint under the rule of reason, stated "The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Id.
135. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
136. See infra Part IV.D.
137. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1391.
138. Id.
139. See also National Soc. ofProf'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
140. See also Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 883 (1953) (stating
that a plaintiff need not allege an intent on the part of the co-conspirators to restrain trade if the
purported conspiracy has an anti-competitive effect).
141. See also Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1990)
(stating that an agreement injures competition when it obstructs the achievement of one or more
basic goals of competition, namely, lower prices, increased output, and preventing more efficient
production methods in the relevant market).
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ownership.' 42 The next question, therefore, is whether this agreement can be
said to exist among two or more entities.
To establish a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, an antitrust
plaintiff must first establish that the NFL Bylaws are an "agreement" among
two or more entities. In defending against antitrust suits attacking numerous
NFL agreements and activities, the NFL has consistently argued that its
policies are not agreements between two or more business entities because
the NFL is a single entity incapable of conspiring with itself.143 Because
section 1 requires a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade" among two or more parties, the single entity approach, if adopted by
a court, would effectively exempt the NFL from all antitrust liability.'"
However, it is now well established that the NFL is not a single entity, but
rather a joint venture of separate entities which are capable of conspiring
with each other under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
45
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL (the
"Raiders" case), 146 the Ninth Circuit stated three reasons for its renunciation
of the NFL's single entity theory.1 47  The court found that the logical
extension of the single entity argument would be to make the League
incapable of ever violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. 48  Such antitrust
immunity would contradict the extensive precedent set for holding the NFL
subject to the Sherman Act.149 The court also stated that other organizations
142. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
143. See Daniel E. Lazaroff The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions
in Professional Sports, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 157 (1984).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see also Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1387-88.
145. Raiders, 726 F.2d 1381; see also North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d
Cir. 1982). An in-depth discussion of the single entity theory is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For extensive discussion of the single entity theory, see Lazaroff; supra note 143
(arguing that the NFL is not a single entity). But see Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of
Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 TUL. L. REV. 562
(1987); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1
(1983); John C. Weistat, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition
and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, DuKE L.J. 1013 (1984).
146. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
147. Id. at 1388 (holding section 4.3 of the NFL Constitution, which required a three-
quarters affirmative vote from existing NFL owners when a team sought to relocate, violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act).
148. Id. at 1388.
149. See id.; see also Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 801 (1977); North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), afTfd in
part, rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); Kapp v.
NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal vacated, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 907; United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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have been found to violate section 1 even though their product was "just as
unitary . and requires the same kind of cooperation from the
organization's members [as does the NFL]. '' o
Finally, the court stated that the NFL is an association of teams
sufficiently independent and competitive with one another to warrant rule of
reason scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 5' The court found that
NFL teams possess all the indicia of independent competitors: they are
independently owned, thus separately accountable for their own profits and
losses, and they compete with each other to acquire the best players,
coaches, and management personnel.'52 Also, in areas where two teams
operate in close proximity, there is competition for fan support, local
television and radio revenues, and media access.' 53 Consequently, the court
held that the necessity for cooperation through joint venture did not preclude
the teams from competing with each other.' 4
Shortly after Raiders, the Supreme Court held in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp."' that a corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary was a single enterprise for purposes of section 1.116 The NFL has
since attempted to argue that Copperweld overturned prior caselaw,
including Raiders, that held that the NFL and its member clubs do not
constitute a single enterprise. 17 However, the NFL's Copperweld argument
was rejected by the First Circuit in Sullivan.'58
The First Circuit stated that the parent-subsidiary form of ownership
that was involved in Copperweld was distinguishable from the NFL joint
venture type of organization.1 59 The Sullivan court noted that the subsidiary
in Copperweld, although legally distinct from its parent, pursued the
common interests of the whole rather than interests separate from those of
the parent corporation. 60 In contrast, the court found that NFL member
150. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1388 (quoting Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 519
F. Supp. 581, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1981)); see also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-
42(1968).
151. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1389.
152. Id. at 1389-90.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
156. Id.
157. See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp.
871, 879-80 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that Copperweld did not apply to the NFL and its member
clubs and finding the clubs to be separate entities capable of conspiring together under section 1).
158. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099.
159. Id. at 1099.
160. Id.
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clubs compete in several ways both on and off the field.)6 1 Having such
diverse interests, the court held that the NFL could not properly be
considered a single entity under section 1.162
Finally, as further evidence that the NFL is not a single entity,
Congress has twice granted the NFL specific limited exemptions from
antitrust regulation. The first exemption concerned antitrust immunity for
the NFL's 1961 pooled television rights agreement. 63  The second
exemption concerned the merger agreement between the NFL and the
American Football League ("AFL").' 64 Such specific legislative exemptions
from antitrust regulation would not be necessary if the NFL were a "single
entity" within the meaning of cases interpreting section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
2. Element Two: Whether the NFL's Prohibition on Public Ownership Is
Intended to Harm or Unreasonably Restrain Competition
The NFL has suggested several reasons for banning corporate
ownership. 16' Former NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle stated that public
corporate ownership would make it impossible for the NFL to maintain
control of the League.' 66 Rozelle was concerned that public ownership
would splinter control of a team among thousands of individuals making it
difficult, if not impossible, for the NFL to control who owned the team.
67
Furthermore, Rozelle claimed that public ownership could make the effective
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 879-90.
163. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1994)) (permitting organized sports franchises to combine to
negotiate television broadcasting rights).
164. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-900, U.S.C.C.A.N. (80 Stat.) 1515, § 6(bX1). The
1996 amendment extended the exemption from antitrust laws to include a joint agreement by
which the member clubs of two or more professional football leagues combine their operations in
an expanded single league (the NFL-AFL merger). Id. After the 1966 amendment, section 1291
provided as follows:
[Sluch laws shall not apply to a joint agreement by which the member clubs of two
or more professional football leagues, which are exempt from income tax under [the
Internal Revenue Code] ... combine their operations in expanded single league so
exempt from income tax, if such agreement increases rather than decreases the
number of professional football clubs so operating, and the provisions of which are
directly relevant thereto.
15 U.S.C. § 1291.
165. Corporately Yours, supra note 108, at 15.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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management of a team difficult, and could create a conflict between the
interests of the shareholders and the interests of the NFL.1
68
Second, the NFL has expressed concern that publicly owned
corporations would be able to provide more funding than any current
owner.169 The availability of greater funds would give publicly owned teams
an "unfair competitive advantage."' 70 The NFL fears that if a few teams
dominate the League, coupled with a lack of interesting rivalries, fan support
would decline, eventually resulting in the NFL's demise.'
71
Third, the NFL is concerned that public ownership will result in undue
commercialization of the NFL.'7 The fear is that certain corporations
would view professional football as a means of promoting their other
businesses. 73 For instance, if Disney were to buy a football franchise, the
focus of this franchise, the NFL fears, would shift from promoting football
to advertising for Disney and its products.
A fourth reason the NFL disfavors public ownership is that some
owners fear that it would eliminate the public's perception of NFL
franchises as individually or family owned "mom-and-pop operations."' 74
The NFL would like the public to believe that it is essentially a "club of
cigar-puffing old men sitting in leather chairs sipping scotch," looking out
for the welfare of the players and fans.
175
These four reasons evidence an intent to restrain competition. By
prohibiting public ownership, the NFL is limiting who may compete for
ownership of an NFL franchise.' 76 The Sullivan court stated that by
restricting all sales of a particular type of ownership interest, the broad-
based policy potentially compromises the entire competitive process for the
buying and selling of a club ownership.'" While the intent to harm
competition is blatant, the Sullivan court stated that whether the NFL's




169. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1100.






176. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1100.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1098. See discussion infra Part IV.D (discussing how none of these four concerns
justify the harm to competition by the blanket anti-public ownership policy of the NFL since all the
stated concerns can be addressed by less restrictive means).
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3. Element Three: Whether the Public Ownership Policy Causes Injury to
Competition
There are three factors to consider in determining whether an
agreement actually causes injury to competition. First, the relevant market
in which the competition occurs must be defined. Second, the existence of
competition in that market must be demonstrated. Finally, injury to that
competition must be shown.
a. Market Analysis
The Supreme Court has stated that an antitrust analysis void of market
considerations would lack any objective benchmarks. 179  The concept of a
"relevant market" provides the context in which to examine any alleged
injury to competition. 80 In the antitrust context, the relevant market has two
components: (1) the product market; and (2) the geographic market.'
The relevant product market has been defined as commodities
reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purpose. 8 2  All
commodities must be considered, including actual rivals or potential rivals to
the market.'83 The relevant geographic market has been defined as the "area
in which a potential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services he
or she seeks.''
18 4
In determining the relevant market in antitrust cases involving the
NFL, the NFL has often argued that the product market consists of all forms
of entertainment, and the geographic market is the United States.'85 While
the unique nature of NFL football makes the market definition especially
difficult, 86 courts have declined to define the product market in the NFL
179. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1988).
180. Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
924 (1980).
181. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1392; see also Kaplan, 611 F.2d at 291; Chisholm Bros. Farm
Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 1974).
182. SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (3d Cir. 1978).
183. Id. at 1063.
184. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
185. See, e.g., Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1393; Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1112.
186. See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1391-92 (stating that market definition is difficult due to the
NFL's structure containing both horizontal and vertical attributes). For example, the League can
be viewed as an organization of 30 competitors, an example of horizontal arrangement. Id. On the
other hand, with the owners having a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the League
itself and collective action being necessary in some areas, the NFL resembles a vertical
arrangement. Id.
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context as a general entertainment market. 87 Rather, in Sullivan, the jury,
in defining the relevant market for the NFL's prohibition on public
ownership, found that the relevant market was a nationwide market (the
geographic market) for the sale and purchase of ownership interests in
member clubs in general and in the New England Patriots in particular (the
product market). 18 8 Thus, it appears that the relevant market for the NFL's
prohibition on public ownership, including the prohibition on community-
owned public franchises proposed by this Comment, should be considered
the nationwide market for the sale and purchase of ownership interests in
member clubs.
b. The Existence of Competition
In order for a public corporation to establish a claim for antitrust
injury against the NFL, it must prove that there is harm to the competition.
In Sullivan, the NFL attempted to argue that no competition existed between
NFL clubs for the sale of ownership interests. 8 9 The First Circuit
disagreed, holding that sufficient evidence was presented to allow a jury to
reasonably believe that competition existed between teams for the sale of
ownership interests.19° Competition was inherently proved by the NFL's
admission that the purpose of the public ownership policy was to enable the
current owners to compete with other teams in the market for investment
capital and the sale of ownership interests in NFL teams.' 9'
Furthermore, the court stated that "evidence of actual, present
competition is not necessary as long as the evidence shows that the potential
for competition exists."' 92 Indeed, it would be difficult to provide direct
evidence of competition when the NFL effectively prohibits it. Thus, relying
on Sullivan, it appears that a publicly owned entity would be able to prove
that competition exists between NFL clubs for the sale of ownership
interests.
187. See id. at 1394 (stating that NFL football has limited substitutes from a consumer
standpoint); Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1097.
188. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1097.
189. Id. at 1099.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1100.
192. Id. (citing Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1394).
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c. Actual Harm to Competition
Restricting competition has been held to be a sufficient antitrust
injury. 193 On the other hand, sports leagues are generally allowed to impose
conditions and requirements on who, if anyone, may join as a franchise
member or acquire an existing team.' 94  The prohibition on public
ownership, however, is distinguishable from this well-established rule.
In Sullivan, the NFL unsuccessfully argued that the two situations are
indistinguishable. 95 The NFL cited such cases as Mid-South Grizzlies v.
NFL,' 96 Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. NHL, 197 and Levine v. NBA198
as support for its argument. These cases all involved a professional sports
league's refusal to approve individual transfers of team ownership or of the
creation of new teams. 199 In these cases, no antitrust injury was found to
exist.
The Sullivan court distinguished these cases, refusing to accept the
NFL's argument that its ownership policy does not injure competition. 200
The court found that these cases did not involve injury to competition
because the plaintiffs were not competing with the defendant sports
leagues.20°  Instead, plaintiffs were seeking to join those leagues.20 2  The
court found that refusing to approve a given sale transaction or a new team
merely prevents particular outsiders from joining the league, but does not
limit competition between the teams themselves. 0 3
On the other hand, the NFL's policy against public ownership
generally restricts competition between clubs for the sale of their ownership
interests.2°4 Such a prohibition eliminates an entire class of entities from
competing for an NFL franchise. The First Circuit relied on North
American Soccer League v. NFL ("NASL"), 20 which held that the NFL's
policy against cross-ownership of NFL teams and franchises in competing
193. See generally id.
194. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1098.
195. Id. at 1098.
196. 720 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1983).
197. 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).
198. 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).






205. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
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sports leagues injured competition between the leagues, thereby violating
section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 °6
The restriction at issue in NASL is analogous to the NFL's ban on
public ownership. Similar to the prohibition in the NFL's Bylaws, the
policy at issue in NASL effectively barred a class of owners, namely those
who owned other franchises, from purchasing NFL teams. 20 7 Accordingly, it
is evident that a restriction on who may own an NFL team, specifically a
prohibition on public ownership, injures competition.
In support of a community-owned entity claim that the NFL Bylaws
restricts competition and produces injury thereto, it can point to the standard
indicators of the existence of injury. The normal incidents of injury to
competition are (1) reduced output; (2) increased price; and (3) reduced
efficiency.20 8 It is likely that a publicly owned franchise will be able to
establish sufficient evidence of these injuries.
First, the Sullivan court noted that the NFL's public ownership policy
completely eliminates a certain type of ownership interest-public
ownership of stock.2)9 By restricting output in one form of ownership, the
NFL is thereby reducing the output of ownership interests overall.210 In
Sullivan, the NFL attempted to argue that output was not affected because
its ownership policy did not limit the number of games or teams, did not
raise ticket prices, and did not affect the normal consumer of the NFL's
211product in any way. In rejecting this argument, the First Circuit stated
that it is irrelevant that consumers of "NFL football" are not affected by
output.212 Rather, the focus is on whether consumers of the NFL in the
relevant market are affected.
213
The court found that the public ownership prohibition potentially
harms two types of consumers: (1) those who want to buy stock in an NFL
franchise; and (2) team owners, such as Sullivan, wishing to "purchase"
investment capital in the market for public financing.214 Thus, the public
ownership policy literally restricts the output of a product-a share in an
NFL franchise.215
206. Id.
207. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1098.
208. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1990).






215. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1101.
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With respect to the policy's effect on prices, the NFL has correctly
argued that the alleged effect of prohibiting public ownership is to reduce
prices of NFL team ownership interests, rather than to raise them.216 The
reduced price occurs because NFL franchises would likely command a
premium on the public market relative to their value in the private market.21 7
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in NCAA v. Board of
Regents. 21 The Court found that in determining whether there has been an
injury to competition, the overall effect on consumer preference is more
important than the effect on price. 219 The public ownership policy is clearly
unresponsive to consumer demand for ownership interests in NFL teams.
Experts in the Sullivan case testified that fans are extremely interested in
purchasing shares in NFL teams, and that the NFL's policy deprives fans of
this product. 220 Furthermore, the successful public offerings of the National
Basketball Association's ("NBA") Boston Celtics in 1986 and the National
Hockey League's ("NHL") Florida Panthers in 1996, as well as the
impending offering of Major League Baseball's ("MLB") Cleveland Indians
demonstrates the high level of fan interest in buying ownership in
professional sports teams.22' Thus, the NFL's policy injures competition in
the relevant market not by raising prices, but by causing the market to be
"unresponsive to consumer preference. ' ,222
It is also likely that a jury could find that the public ownership policy
hinders efficiency in the relevant market.22  First, the policy hinders
efficiency by preventing certain highly skilled and experienced individuals
from owning teams. 224  These individuals may be unable to buy a team
privately because of scarce resources. Second, the NFL policy prohibits
certain types of management structures that may be more efficient and
produce higher quality teams than the current teams.225 Finally, it is
acknowledged that an increased access to capital can improve a team's
216. Id.
217. Id. Fan loyalty is a prominent factor in elevating the ownership price if public offerings
were made.
218. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
219. Id. (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 107).
220. Id.
221. See Sandra Livingston & Zach Schiller, National Stock Plan Is Jacobs' Double Play:
Indians Owner Gets Millions with No Loss of Control, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 20, 1998,
at lA.
222. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 87.
223. Id. at 85.
224. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1101-02.
225. Id. at 1102.
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operations and performance.226 The public ownership policy restricts access
to capital, thereby, limiting all NFL teams' ability to be strong and
competitive.227 Thus, the policy clearly affects the overall efficiency in the
NFL.
D. The Balancing Test
After establishing that a publicly owned corporation can make a prima
facie antitrust case under the rule of reason, a court will determine whether
the anti-competitive effects of the policy outweigh the NFL's public
ownership policy's legitimate business justifications.228
1. Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
The NFL has repeatedly raised the ancillary restraints doctrine as a
defense to antitrust challenges.229  When a restraint is "ancillary" to the
functioning of a joint activity, that is, the restraint is required to make the
joint activity more efficient, then the injury to competition caused by this
restraint does not necessarily violate antitrust law. 30 Courts have agreed
that it is possible that League rules restricting competition may be ancillary
211to a legitimate joint activity.
However, ancillary restraints alone are not per se justifications for
NFL policies that otherwise constitute unreasonable restraints of trade under
the Sherman Act. 32  The Sullivan court, for example, stressed that the
holdings in the cases discussing ancillary restraints did not ignore the rule of
reason once a restraint was found to be ancillary to legitimate and efficient
activity. 233 Rather, the injury to competition must still be weighed against
226. Dave Anderson, Jones Successfully Buys NFL Crown, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan.
29, 1996, at B4. For example, Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones, one of the richest owners in the
League, spent more than $40 million in signing bonuses during the 1995-96 NFL season. Id. The
Cowboys were able to lure Deion Sanders away from the 49ers with a $35 million contract and
offered other large signing bonuses to secure other top talent. Id. The following year the talent-
packed Cowboys were Super Bowl Champions. Id.
227. Sullivan, 34 F.3d. at 1102.
228. Id. at 1096 (citing Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988)).
229. See, e.g., Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1102; Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1381.
230. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 293-98 (1985); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1971); United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), af'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (discussing the ancillary restraint doctrine).
231. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1102.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25; Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S.
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the purported benefits. 2"4 The fact that the injury to competition may be
ancillary merely means that the scale may tip in the favor of the restraint.235
2. Balancing the Harms and Benefits of the NFL's Prohibition on Public
Ownership
In Sullivan, errors in determining how to balance the harms and
benefits in the appropriate market led in part to the case being remanded.
236
In Sullivan, the District Court instructed the jury to balance the injury to
competition in the nationwide market for the sale and purchase of ownership
interests in NFL member clubs with the benefits to competition in that same
relevant market. 237 The NFL protested, arguing that the pro-competitive
effects of the NFL's policy in the broader entertainment market should have
been weighed against the anti-competitive effects of the prohibition in the
market the jury found.238 The NFL contended that the beneficial effects of
its prohibition on public ownership policy were not readily apparent in the
market that the jury found, but it had a beneficial effect for the NFL as a
whole by enhancing its ability to effectively produce and present a popular
entertainment product.
239
The Sullivan court, agreeing with the NFL, stated that several courts
had found it appropriate to balance the anti-competitive effects on
competition in one market with certain pro-competitive benefits in another
market.240 While it appears to be a balancing of apples and oranges, the
court stated that this kind of balancing was not impossible. 24' In making this
determination, the Sullivan court discussed how the Supreme Court
arguably endorsed this kind of balancing test in Continental T. V, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc.242 In Continental, the Court recognized that positive
effects on interbrand competition could justify anti-competitive effects on
intrabrand competition.24' The Sullivan court thus determined that because
the entertainment market was closely related to the nationwide market for the
at 293-98).
234. Id.
235. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1103.
236. Id. at 1113.
237. Id. at 1111.
238. Id. at 1112.
239. Id. at 1113.
240. Id. at 1112 (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 115-20; Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of
New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir. 1988); M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire
Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 986 (1st Cir. 1984); Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1381, 1392, 1397, 1399).
241. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1112.
242. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
243. Id.
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sale and purchase of NFL teams, the jury could weigh the benefits of the
NFL's prohibition on public ownership in the entertainment market against
the harms of the prohibition in the nationwide market for the sale and
purchase of ownership interests in NFL clubs.244 This conclusion makes the
critical inquiry whether the benefits to the NFL as a whole resulting from the
prohibition on public ownership outweigh the injury caused by this
prohibition.245
3. Less Restrictive Means
The Sullivan court held that if there is a reasonable, less restrictive
alternative that would provide the same benefits as the current restraint, the
benefits of the restriction cannot outweigh its harm to competition. 246 The
NFL claims that its policy against public ownership of teams is intended to
ensure the following four benefits: (1) controlling ownership of League
teams; (2) sustaining a competitive balance between the teams; (3)
preventing commercialization of the League; and (4) maintaining the NFL's
image as an individual or family-run operation.247 However, there are less
restrictive alternatives to the NFL's public ownership policy that would
yield the same benefits.248
a. Maintaining Ownership Control
The NFL need not completely ban public ownership in order to retain a
reasonable degree of control over the management of League teams. Rather,
in each particular instance the NFL need only require the officers and
directors of a publicly owned corporation to abide by applicable NFL
guidelines for "new members."2 49
Such requirements for new members, however, should be amended to
exempt all stockholders-except possibly shareholders holding five percent
or more of the voting power of the corporation-from having to comply with
these requirements. As currently written, it would be impossible for a
publicly held corporation to comply with such requirements. For example,
section 3.3(A)(2) states in part that a written financial statement shall be
244. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1112.
245. Id. at 1113; see also Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1394 (stating that the critical inquiry was
whether the benefits to the League as a whole were outweighed by the harm caused by rule 4.3).
246. Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1103 (citing Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1396).
247. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
248. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1103.
249. NFL CONST., supra note 54, art. III, § 3.1(a).
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required from any applicant, including all stockholders.25° Section 3.3(C)
states that each holder of any interest in a membership, including
stockholders, must be individually approved by the affirmative three-
quarters vote of the NFL owners.25' Obviously, it would be impossible to
apply this type of individual approval to the hundreds or thousands of
possible shareholders in a public offering. A less restrictive way to avoid
hidden shareholder control would be to place a limitation on the size of the
holding by any one individual or family, resulting in no majority
shareholders. 52
NFL team owners also have expressed concern that NFL operations
would be impaired by publicly owned teams because the short-term profit
motive of a club's shareholders might conflict with the long-term interests of
the League as a whole.253 If the board of directors and officers exercising
authority over team operations of the publicly owned entity were approved
by the NFL, it is likely that they would be persons who would keep the long-
term interests of the League in mind. If necessary, the NFL also could
create guidelines as to the timing and amount of dividends to be paid out to
shareholders. In any event, there is no inherent likelihood that the current
private owners put the long-term interests of the League above their own
desire for quick profit.254 In fact, the exact opposite is true for potential fan-
shareholders, each holding too little stock to pursue personal interests over
maintaining the viability of the team and League.
Article IX of the NFL Bylaws describes prohibited conduct of its
member clubs. 255  As currently drafted, prohibited conduct applies to
shareholders, officers, directors, managers, and other related persons. If
strictly enforced, these rules would make public ownership of an NFL team
a practical impossibility. For example, section 9.1(C) states that no
stockholder shall bet on any game in which a member club participates. -56
While it is true that allowing anyone owning a membership interest to bet on
League games would undermine the credibility of the League,257 such a
250. Id. § 3.3(AX2).
251. Id. § 3.3(C).
252. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1103.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Leone, supra note 3, at 493. The NFL's argument is belied by the frequent
relocation of teams in the past decade, believed by many to be the result of the desire to maximize
profits at the expense of fan loyalty and League stability. See Mullick, supra note 6, at 15; Starr,
supra note 6, at MI.
255. NFL CONST., supra note 54, art. IX.
256. Id. § 9.1(C).
257. See Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (recognizing that because of
the importance of fan confidence, player gambling rules were "necessary for the survival of the
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restriction is overbroad as applied to all shareholders of a publicly owned
franchise. For example, a person holding 200 shares of an NFL team
having 10,000,000 shares of outstanding voting stock, has no more influence
on the outcome of games than any other fan and should be allowed to bet on
NFL games to the same extent as any member of the public. This restriction
could easily be amended to apply only to those shareholders holding five
percent or more of the voting power of the company, and officers, directors,
and managers who actually have some control over the team.
By amending the NFL Bylaws to apply only to those shareholders with
substantial voting power or otherwise involved directly in the management
of an NFL franchise, the NFL could maintain control of each team in a less
restrictive manner than a total prohibition on publicly owned teams.
b. Retaining Competitive Balance
The benefit of preserving competitive balance within the NFL could
also be controlled with less than an outright ban on public ownership.
Competitive balance means that all NFL teams are of sufficiently
comparable playing strength to provide competitive and high quality games
that are close, exciting, and well-played. 258 The basic assumption is that
publicly owned corporations have a greater access to capital than private
259owners, giving corporate teams a competitive advantage.
There are several reasons why allowing public ownership may not
necessarily result in a competitive imbalance. First, publicly held corporate-
owned teams may not always have greater access to capital, and even if they
do, there is not always a direct correlation between the amount a team
spends on player salaries and on-field performance. For example, the
privately owned Dallas Cowboys annually record a profit of five times
greater than the Green Bay Packers, the only corporately owned team in the
League.260 Although certain corporations such as mega-giants like Disney
and Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. would have greater access to capital
than most privately owned teams, a publicly owned team formed for the sole
purpose of operating a football team, such as this Comment proposes, may
have funds similar to the Packers.
In any event, the amount a team spends on player salaries is not always
determinative of on-field performance. For example, the Los
League").
258. See McNeil v. NFL, 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 169,982 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
259. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1100.
260. Ivey, supra note 27, at B1. Compare the Dallas Cowboys average annual profit of over
S25 million with the Green Bay Packers average annual profit of just S5 million. See id.; Mulhern,
supra note 48, at C4.
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Angeles/Oakland Raiders, the Miami Dolphins, and the Cleveland
Browns/Baltimore Ravens have spent liberally on players, but have had little
on-field success to show for it.
261
It is also useful to compare the effect that publicly owned franchises
have had on the competitive balance in the other major sports leagues. The
NBA, NHL, and MLB all have at least one publicly owned franchise
each. 62 The Boston Celtics franchise is forty percent publicly owned.263
The Toronto Blue Jays, New York Knicks, and Boston Bruins are publicly
owned in whole or in part.264  The Florida Panthers are 58% owned by
investors who paid $10 a share.265 Permitting public ownership of at least a
minority interest in a professional team's stock has not harmed the operation
of these franchises or the respective sports league.2e
Second, corporate teams may simply operate without the help of
government subsidies that non-corporate-owned teams receive. Public
ownership may merely help shift the burden of financing a team from the
general tax-paying public, which currently subsidizes many private NFL
owners, to the shareholders of the team.267 Ideally, the raising of capital by
sale of stock to the public would enable publicly owned teams to assume the
responsibility of paying NFL fees, building stadiums and practice facilities,
and financing all other team operating expenses. Thus, corporate access to
capital primarily would be used to replace some, if not all, public subsidies,
instead of being spent on player salaries.
Third, the NFL already controls the competitive balance through its
1993 Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with the NFL Players
Association in the form of spending limits on teams-the "salary cap.
2 68
261. See Scott McPhee, First Down, Goal to Go: Enforcing the NFL's Salary Cap Using
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 449 (1997). At
one point, the Raiders had three Heisman Trophy winners on their roster: Marcus Allen, Bo
Jackson, and Tim Brown. Id. at 466. Despite exceptional talent, the Raiders have had only four
winning seasons in the past 10 years. Id. Likewise, the Browns/Ravens had the seventh largest
payroll in 1995, paid out the second most in bonuses, yet finished 5-11 and failed to make the
playoffs. Id. The Dolphins had the sixth largest payroll in 1995, issued more than $20 million in
bonuses, and finished 9-7, failing to advance past the first round of the playoffs. Id.
262. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON SPORTS
AND THE LAW 175 (Supp. 1995).
263. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1095.
264. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 262, at 174.
265. Rice Elliott Almond, Stock in M's, Hawks? It's a Thought; Public Stake in Teams
'Worth Pursuing, 'THE SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997 (News), at Al.
266. See Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations
from Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League
Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REv. 57 (1997).
267. See discussion supra Part III.B-C.
268. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000 art. XXIV (1993) [hereinafter
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The CBA's salary cap clause limits the amount of money each team may
spend on salaries and benefits for both veteran and rookie players. 269 The
Salary Cap was specifically enacted to prevent teams with greater revenue
potential from consistently outbidding less affluent teams for the top
talent.270  The CBA also provides a guaranteed League-wide minimum
salary of at least fifty-eight percent of the League's defined gross revenues
("DGR").271 This requirement forces teams that historically have carried a
low player payroll to pay higher individual salaries, and thus, presumably
272remain more competitive.
While some of the League's more aggressive owners have found ways
to circumvent the Salary Cap,273 it remains a fact that there are NFL
provisions in effect designed to maintain a competitive balance among
teams. 2 74  Any new bylaws, or changes to the current bylaws, enacted to
better maintain the competitive balance could be applied equally effectively
to a publicly owned team.
Finally, the wealth of a corporate team may actually improve the
viability of the League as a whole rather than lead to its demise. Wealthy
corporately owned teams do not necessarily harm the current balance of the
League. If wealthy teams mean successful teams, then having more
successful teams in the League should increase the League's overall
financial strength. Because the NFL has a comprehensive revenue-sharing
CBA].
269. See id. arts. XXIV, XVII. The Salary Cap creates a League-wide salary system that
includes a minimum and maximum amount teams may spend on player salaries and benefits. See
id. art. XXIV. The CBA determines what percentage of the League's defined gross revenues
("DGR") will be spent on all player costs for that given season. See id. The DGR is calculated by
adding the revenue generated League-wide from ticket sales and broadcast rights to NFL games.
See id. Each team's total payroll is then set at a fixed percentage of its equal share of the League's
revenues. See id. For example, in 1994, the first year of the Salary Cap, the projected DGR was
$1.7 billion. See MARTIN J. GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 1.07(10) (Cumulative Supp.
1995) [hereinafter SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 1995]. The fixed percentage was set at 64% of the
DGR. CBA, supra note 268, art. XXIV, § 4(a)(1). With 28 NFL teams in 1994, the aggregate
amount allocated for player salaries and benefits was just over $1.09 billion, or about $39 million
per club. SPORTS LAW PRACTICE, supra, § 1.07(10).
270. See McPhee, supra note 261, at 457.
271. CBA, supra note 268, art. XVII, §2.
272. See McPhee, supra note 261, at 459.
273. Allen Barra, How the 49ers Beat the Salary Cap, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at 35.
274. Ways to cure the ineffectiveness of the Salary Cap in order to better ensure a competitive
balance are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of the inefficiencies of the NFL's
current salary cap system, see McPhee, supra note 261.
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system, a strong, successful team will actually increase the revenue pie,
providing more income for other League members.275
Corporate-owned teams could also increase the value of every
individual NFL franchise. 276 This notion is supported by the recent sale of
the Los Angeles Dodgers to Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. for a reported
price of approximately $311 million.2" Commentators have estimated that
this transaction increased the value of all other MLB teams by ten to twenty
percent. 278  Thus, strong NFL teams, whether because of corporate
ownership or otherwise, should raise the value for every other team in the
open market.
c. Preventing Commercialization of the NFL
The fear concerning undue commercialization of the NFL can be
resolved in a number of ways without prohibiting all public corporate
ownership. For example, as currently required under section 3.2 of the NFL
Bylaws, only corporations formed solely for the purpose of operating an
NFL franchise are eligible for membership.2 79 Also, section 3.1 (e) of the
NFL Bylaws states that after becoming a member of the League, the
primary purpose of the entity must at all times be the operation of a
professional football team.210  Restricting the use of public ownership to
corporations formed solely for the purpose of running an NFL franchise
would eliminate any concerns that the corporation would use football as a
means to promote other products.
An even less restrictive way to limit commercialization would be for
the NFL to allow any type of corporation to own an NFL franchise, but to
actively enforce its bylaws dealing with advertising of products.28'
Currently, not all the NFL owners abide by these licensing rules, making it
275. Ostfield, supra note 7, at 604.
276. The possibility of public ownership increasing the purchase price of NFL franchises to a
level that few private owners can afford is not factor under a section 1 analysis because a basic
premise of the Sherman Act is that regulation of private profit is best left to the marketplace, rather
than private agreement. See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1397
(9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927)).
277. See Ross Newhan, Owners Vote Today on Sale of Dodgers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1998, at ClI.
278. See Ross Newhan, These Guys Should Know How to Communicate, L.A. TIMEs, Mar.
20, 1998, at W3.
279. NFL CONST., supra note 54, art. III, § 3.2.
280. Id. § 3.11(e).
281. See id. § 3.11(g) (requiring all members to agree to be bound by all of the terms and
provisions of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws).
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possible for current private owners of the NFL to unduly commercialize the
League.282
The NFL could also require any public corporations desiring
membership to enter into specific contractual arrangements with the NFL
promising to abide by League guidelines. The possibility of preventing
commercialization by contractual arrangement is supported by the recent
sale of the Los Angeles Dodgers to Rupert Murdoch's News Corp.283 News
Corp. also owns Fox Television, prompting several MLB team owners to
express concern about News Corp. abiding by baseball regulations
governing international and local telecasts. 2 4 In negotiating the sale, the
chief operating officer of News Corp. entered into a specific agreement with
major league baseball assuring that he would protect the Dodger image and
abide by all baseball negotiations.285 While it remains to be seen whether
such arrangements will effectively protect MLB's interests, Rupert
Murdoch's "side agreements" with that League serve as an example of how
specific fears can be alleviated by contractual agreement.
d. The Fallacy of the NFL Being a "Mom-and-Pop" Organization
It may be comforting to envision the NFL being run by a small, close-
knit club of individuals who hold football dearest to their hearts. Indeed, it
is romantic to think of the teams being owned by noble, idealistic, family
people, free of controversy and scandal, serving fans of all generations.
While NFL owners are often "super-fans" who originally acquire franchises
seeking to maximize their enjoyment of the game, owners also want to
maximize their profits once a franchise is acquired.286 Owning a franchise
can be a lucrative investment, with financial benefits including tax
advantages, annual direct profits, and, most significantly, profit from the
sale of a franchise.287
282. See Piraino, supra note 94, at 1684. For instance, the Dallas Cowboys have openly
defied this policy, entering into independent marketing agreements with Nike, PepsiCo, and
American Express. See McPhee, supra note 261, at 471.
283. See Murray, supra note 90, at WI.
284. Ross Newhan, Owners Vote Today, supra note 277, at CI1.
285. Ross Newhan, These Guys Should Know, supra note 278, at W3. Rupert Murdoch is
quoted as saying, "As owners of the Dodgers, we will work hand in hand with the other owners to
further assure the long-term growth and success of America's pastime." Id.
286. GEORGE H. SAGE, POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN SPORT 138-39, 154 (1990).
287. Id.; see also Piraino, supra note 94, at 1703. The Baltimore Orioles sold for $70
million in 1989. Id. In 1994, after the State of Maryland built Camden Yard for the Orioles, the
team was sold for $173 million, representing an appreciation of 250% in just four years. Id.
Further, Art Modell paid $4 million for the Cleveland Browns in 1961. Id. With the Browns' new
stadium in Baltimore, estimates of the team's worth are now close to $200 million. Id.
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Make no mistake, the NFL is "big business. '' 88 Indeed, Article II of
the NFL Bylaws states that the League is formed for the purpose of
promoting the primary business of League members. 89 With this in mind, it
is clear that a publicly owned NFL franchise would not change the current
"big business" character of the NFL. Furthermore, whether a team is
publicly or privately owned, the entertainment value of the League will not
be affected. If anything, public ownership will result in improved quality
and more exciting League games, especially because potential fan-
shareholders will truly be able to cheer for their "own" team.290 Moreover,
public ownership should increase fans' loyalty to the NFL because they can
take pride in and achieve personal benefit from their investment.
21
Thus, viable less restrictive alternatives exist to the NFL's prohibition
on public ownership, making it likely that the benefits of such a prohibition
cannot outweigh the harms it causes. Unless the NFL takes a hard look at
its anti-public ownership policy, it could be in for more antitrust problems.
V. CONCLUSION
With the possibility that the NFL's prohibition on public ownership
violates section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the time has come to
challenge this policy. Since the NFL recently granted the Lemer-Policy
group ownership of the Cleveland Browns, creating thirty-one NFL teams,
the NFL is clamoring to find an appropriate city in which to locate a thirty-
second team.292 With the stark reality that it will take money-lots of
money-to win the NFL's affection, a community-owned franchise provides
a practical solution to the main obstacle cities confront when trying to entice
the League to grant its area a new franchise.
Furthermore, public ownership obviates the need for a city to seduce a
franchise from another desirous NFL city. Rather, community-based
ownership gives NFL fans the unique opportunity to build a team through
their own resources and to become owners of the franchise. With ownership
rights come pride, love of the game, and loyalty to the NFL. Moreover, a
community-owned team would become a permanent fixture in an area, much
like the Green Bay Packers, increasing the stability of the NFL. NFL fans
should not passively allow the NFL to destroy itself in its relentless pursuit
of the almighty dollar. Rather than watching professional football continue
288. SAGE, supra note 286, at 69.
289. NFL CONST., supra note 54, art. II.
290. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1102.
29 1. See Ivey, supra note 27, at 13.
292. See Simers, supra note 15, at C3.
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its play-by-play pageant of opportunism and greed, NFL fans should partake
in a plan to return professional football to its civic foundation.
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